University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics /
Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique
Appliquée — SCEEA

CSSPE/SCEEA Vol. 2, 2018: Practical Ethics:
Issues and Perspectives

Empathy, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, and the Ethics
of Mental Health Care
Andrew Molas
York University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/csspe
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
Molas, Andrew, "Empathy, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, and the Ethics of Mental Health Care" (2018). The Canadian Society for Study of
Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA. 4.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/csspe/vol2/1/4

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted
for inclusion in The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Section 1: Paper 4
Empathy, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, and the Ethics of Mental Health Care
Andrew Molas
York University1
Abstract: I discuss Young’s “asymmetrical reciprocity” and apply it to an ethics of mental health
care. Due to its emphasis on engaging with others through respectful dialogue in an inclusive
manner, asymmetrical reciprocity serves as an appropriate framework for guiding caregivers to
interact with their patients and to understand them in a morally responsible and appropriate
manner. In Section 1, I define empathy and explain its benefits in the context of mental health care.
In Section 2, I discuss two potential problems surrounding empathy: the difficulty of perspectivetaking and “compassion fatigue.” In Section 3, I argue that these issues can be resolved if examined
through the lens of an ethics of care. Reciprocal relationships between patients and caregivers are
an important element in the development of an ethics of care. In Section 4, I introduce two models
of reciprocity that can be applied to a health care context: Benhabib’s symmetrical reciprocity and
Young’s asymmetrical reciprocity. In Section 5, I demonstrate how asymmetrical reciprocity
cultivates empathy and, in Section 6 and Section 7, I show how it overcomes the objections of
empathy and improves therapeutic relationships.

Key words: empathy, asymmetrical reciprocity, ethics of care, mental health

1. The Benefits and Aims of Empathy in Mental Health Care
Empathy is the ability to identify with the experiences and feelings of someone else and it indicates
an opportunity for engaging with another person affectively and experientially. Empathy has been
described as having a “curative effect” in psychotherapy and empathetic relationships between
caregivers and care receivers can sometimes be more important to a patient’s clinical outcome than
the type of treatment administered.2 In terms of its aims, Mercer and Reynolds (2002) argue that
the goal(s) of empathy should be to initiate supportive, interpersonal communication with a patient
in order to understand their needs; empathy should be used to empower the patient to learn or cope
more effectively with their environment and condition; finally, empathy in therapeutic
relationships should aim to reduce or resolve the patient’s problems.3 Although one of the main
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responsibilities for therapists is to help treat patients with their illnesses, Code (1995) maintains
that empathy often figures as a “taken-for-granted component of care” and that a society which
does not possess empathy—and actively tries to minimize its significance—is poorer in quality
because of that deficiency.4 But even though the cultivation of empathy is an integral component
of good care, and has several benefits for patients, there are a few problems associated with it.

2.1 The Limits of Perspective-Taking
For Coplan (2011), empathy requires a complex imaginative process of taking another’s
perspective and, through this process, one “constructs” another’s subjective experience by
“simulating” the experience of being in the other’s situation.5 While empathy can allow for a
genuine mutual understanding between individuals, and can also help towards understanding the
perspectives of other people, Hollan and Throop (2008) explain that the “‘first-person-like
knowledge of others’” typically found in empathetic exchanges is “‘rarely, if ever, considered an
unambiguously good thing.’”6 As Karp and Tanarugsachock (2000) argue, genuinely caring for
others presumes efforts to empathize with them, “to feel what they feel, to try to see the world
from their standpoint, and to take their role.”7 Depending on the type of illness in question (e.g.
schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, clinical depression) and the severity of the symptoms a patient is
experiencing (e.g. delusions, paranoia, hallucinations), it may be very challenging, if not
impossible, for a caregiver to actively try to empathetically engage with someone who is living
with mental health challenges. Role taking requires us to shift between our perspective and “the
imagined point of view of the speaker” in order to understand her.8 But while all role taking is
approximate because we can never fully understand what another person is experiencing, the
problem of accurate role taking in caregivers’ engagement with persons living with mental health
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challenges is that it becomes extremely difficult to understand what they are going through. To
that end, while it is hard enough for a ‘healthy’ person to empathize with someone who is
experiencing a physical illness (e.g. someone who is living with mobility limitations), it is even
more difficult to understand someone “whose mind is thoroughly inaccessible.”9

2.2 Empathic Over-Arousal and “Compassion Fatigue”
According to Simmons (2014), empathy in its fullest form “is typically if not always essential to
caring for another’s well-being.”10 Unlike Coplan, Simmons argues that empathy does not
necessarily need to involve a complex and difficult process of perspective-taking. Instead he
maintains that sharing in others’ emotions by observing the emotional cues in their behaviours is
an empathetic process that can occur rather quickly, and naturally, in a variety of situations.11 For
instance, if I see someone whose eyes are teary, whose shoulders are slumped forward, and whose
face is frowned, I can tell that this person has been crying and is visibly upset. By observing these
emotional and behavioural cues I can empathize with this person and realize that something may
be troubling them. I do not have to “simulate” the other’s experiences, or take their perspective as
my own, to understand that this person is sad. But since empathy, under this account, involves
having the feelings of another “aroused in ourselves” involuntarily, one of the problems with
empathy is that it can result in “empathic over-arousal.”12
Hoffman (2000) explains that if a person’s empathetic experience of another’s situation
becomes intolerable it can result in “‘an intense feeling of personal distress’” which may move
that person out of their “‘empathetic mode’” and drive them to alleviate their own personal distress
rather than attending to the needs of others.13 The implications for mental health care is clear: the
repeated experience of empathetic over-arousal can lead to “compassion fatigue” which results in
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that person’s capacity for feeling compassion for others diminishing over time.14 For instance,
imagine a therapist who is engaging with a person living with severe clinical depression on a daily
basis. Suppose at the beginning of the therapeutic exchange the caregiver is invested fully in the
care and well-being of the other person. At the beginning of this therapeutic process, the caregiver
is attentively listening to their patient's struggles with daily life, the caregiver is genuinely
concerned for the health and safety, and actively seeks to provide coping strategies to support the
recovery of the other person. During the first few meetings with the patient, the caregiver
approaches this person's life and situation with a set of fresh eyes; there is a high level of hope and
optimism and the caregiver ensures that they will do whatever it takes to help support their patient
because this is the career path they have chosen. But suppose that, after several weeks of
therapeutic exchanges, and after devoting significant amounts of time and energy in thinking about
the patient's circumstances, the caregiver notices that the patient's depression is not getting any
better. In fact, suppose that their depression has worsened and they have been unable to follow the
caregiver's advice and strategies for coping with depression. More importantly imagine that,
perhaps due to other life stresses and/or dealing with other patients in the medical facility, the
caregiver gradually becomes less interested in supporting this particular patient's distress. Given
the heavy subject matter of listening to this person's experiences of battling severe depression, the
caregiver becomes more callous and distanced and less engaged in their subsequent therapeutic
exchanges. If the patient’s condition is starting to affect the caregiver in a detrimental way, this
emotional exhaustion felt by the caregiver can jeopardize the therapeutic relationship because she
may neglect her patients’ needs and may not be as emotionally invested as she should be in order
to help them. Since empathy involves some emotional identification with the experiences of others,
too much empathy can negatively impact the quality of mental health care services being provided.
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While empathy does play a beneficial role in improving the lives of persons living with mental
health challenges, without proper guidance or instruction on when and how to implement it,
empathy’s intended purpose can backfire and leave both patients and therapists at a disadvantage.
One way to address the problems of empathy is by examining empathetic practices through the
lens of the ethics of care.

3. The Ethics of Care and the Role of Reciprocity in Therapeutic Relationships
Held (2006) maintains that the central focus of the ethics of care is on the “compelling moral
salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others” for whom we take
responsibility.15 She argues that the ethics of care starts with the moral claims of particular others.16
One of the advantages of an ethics of care in the context of mental health care is that it works with
a conception of persons as relational and interdependent rather than as “the self-sufficient
independent individuals” of other dominant moral theories.17 In the ethics of care, the values of
solidarity, mutual concern between participants, trust, and “empathetic responsiveness” towards
others have priority and, in practices of care, relationships are cultivated, the needs of others are
responded to, and sensitivity between individuals is demonstrated.18
When it comes to acting in a morally appropriate way, Noddings (1984) argues that genuine
acts of care involve an emotional and motivational sensitivity to particular other people. 19 In the
mental health context, the primary responsibility of caregivers is to attend to the needs of their
patients. Since the circumstances of each patient will inevitably be different, it is necessary that
caregivers are sensitive to detail and pay close attention to their patients’ needs in order to
understand their situations and care for them in a responsible way.20 For many care ethicists this
“face-to-face” aspect of care is central because the act of caring is about recognizing the worth of
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the person in front of you and engaging with them in a respectful manner.21 A key component of
Noddings’ view is her emphasis on the reciprocity involved in the development of caring
relationships. Reciprocity is not only helpful for governing interpersonal relationships but it is a
recurring element found in therapeutic relationships as well.
Within the context of professional mental health care, Sandhu et al. (2015) explain that
reciprocity is understood as the presence of “shared interactions” or “shared exchanges” where
caregivers and care recipients behave and respond to each other and, through this process, they
remain engaged in the interaction with an awareness of the other while meeting their own personal
needs.22 One of the core values of reciprocity is its commitment to “mutual respect and cooperation” between caregivers and patients, and one way caregivers can offer this respect is by
giving patients opportunities to participate in mental health care planning and treatment. 23 By
including them in this process, patients are more likely to feel like “valued and normal human
being[s]” and denying them this opportunity for participation can make the patients “feel of less
value than other people.”24 It is important to note that reciprocity in the context of mental health
care is not a one-off occurrence. To be effective, practitioners of reciprocity must build these
relationships with their patients gradually over time. Practicing reciprocity is good for fostering
trusting, caring, and mutually beneficial relationships between patients and caregivers, which can
result in positive patient outcomes. But in constructing a model of reciprocity that can be applied
to an ethics of mental health care, specifically, there are two alternatives: Benhabib’s symmetrical
reciprocity and Young’s asymmetrical reciprocity.

4. The Differences Between Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Reciprocity
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Benhabib (1991) argues that relations of moral respect between individuals arise from dialogue in
which persons aim to reach an understanding with one another. To help move this dialogical
process forward she outlines her position called symmetrical reciprocity. Symmetrical reciprocity
is a view which claims that moral respect consists in a “symmetrical relation of reversibility” where
we take the perspective of the other person by “imaginatively representing their perspective to
ourselves.”25 At first glance, symmetrical reciprocity shares some of the key features of empathy
that I discussed above. Symmetrical reciprocity takes a ‘mirroring’ approach by assuming that both
sides are equally capable of being known and understood by the other person.26 For Benhabib, the
stance of moral respect arises from “putting oneself in the place of others” and equal respect for
the situation and point of view of others requires being able to “reverse positions” with them.27
This ability to reverse perspectives is essential to the “ties of reciprocity that bind communities
together” and that the more we are able to think from the perspective of others, “all the more can
we make vivid to ourselves the narrative histories of others involved.”28
While the motivation behind Benhabib’s position demonstrates a willingness to engage in
dialogue with others, and attempts to bridge distances between groups by dissolving superficial
differences which divide people and are sources of discrimination and injustice (e.g. ability, race,
gender), Young (1997) and La Caze (2008) maintain that symmetrical reciprocity is problematic
because it “obscures difference,” it is “impossible to reverse positions” and it is “politically
suspect” for one person/group of people to identify with the experiences of others.29 Young argues
that these images of reflection and substitutability between ourselves and others support a
“conceptual projection of sameness among people and perspectives at the expense of their
differences.”30 Her worry with Benhabib’s view of identifying moral respect and reciprocity
through relations of symmetry and reversibility of perspectives is that it tends to “close off the
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differentiation among subjects.”31 This is ethically significant because, as Clohesy (2013) argues,
focusing on the “lived experience of difference” allows persons in positions of privilege to see how
they have “denied the singularity of those [they do] not recognize” and shows them how they have
“committed violence” to others in order to “sustain the unity of [their] own identities...”32
Given the inequalities and differences in power relations which exist between people (e.g.
between a patient and her therapist), Young worries that if someone tries to put themselves in the
position of others in order to understand them they too often “put themselves, with their own
particular experiences and privileges” in the positions they see the others being in; her worry is
that the assumptions derived from their position of power and privilege “often allow them
unknowingly to misrepresent the other’s situation” by imposing their own view upon the other.33
In other words, instead of viewing the world from the other person’s view point, symmetrical
reciprocity involves imagining how you, given your situated knowledge,34 would view the world
if you were in that position, not how the other person does view the world from their perspective.
In this process of imaginatively trying to represent to themselves the perspectives of others, Young
maintains that too often those representations “carry projections and fantasies” through which
privileged groups “reinforce a complementary image of themselves.”35 Within the context of
mental health care, I believe one worry is that these projections on the part of caregivers may
reinforce harmful stereotypes or preconceptions about what mental illness is and this can be used
to further discriminate against the care recipients and/or silence their perspectives.
As I have discussed elsewhere, the stigma surrounding mental illness is often enough to
reinforce negative stereotypes of people who fall under the category 'mentally ill', and the mark of
stigma is often enough to discourage people from taking the claims of the other person seriously.
To illustrate with an example taken from patient-caregiver interviews, Schulze and Angermeyer
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(2003) note that some patients with mental health challenges, such as schizophrenia, are reluctant
to disclose their information to their health care providers when seeking treatment for somatic,
bodily illnesses. The reason for doing this is because these patients feel that their complaints and
reports on their physical health and well-being are taken less seriously than are the complaints of
people who do not have schizophrenia and that, on such occasions, their doctors “immediately
considered transferring [them] to the psychiatric unit.”36 Moreover, if caregivers already (think
they) know how their patients feel because they have “imaginatively represented” their patients’
perspectives to themselves, then caregivers may not listen to their patient’s expression of their
perspective very openly and this is a concern for Young.37 Because there are differences and
complexities which exist between persons, I doubt that symmetrical reciprocity can be used by
caregivers in an ethics of mental health care because they cannot substitute their position for
someone
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Due to its insistence on the reversibility of positions between ourselves and others, symmetrical
reciprocity’s ‘mirroring’ approach can lead to inaccurate perspective-taking. Moreover, even if it
could be practiced in a manner which does not co-opt or misrepresent the experiences of others,
too much identification with others can potentially result in empathetic burnout. By contrast, I
believe Young’s theory of asymmetrical reciprocity serves as a more appropriate framework for
an ethics of mental health care, and can help caregivers better relate with their patients in a noninvasive way, because it attempts to understand others across differences “without reversing
perspectives or identifying with each other.”39 The motivation behind asymmetrical reciprocity is
that we can take others’ views into account without imaginatively occupying their position or
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putting ourselves in their place.40 In this sense asymmetrical reciprocity is not quite the same thing
as role-taking because we are not trying to understand the other’s experiences from their
perspective. Rather I understand this approach as the acknowledgement that there are differences
between individuals and yet there is a willingness to engage with others on their own terms. I
believe asymmetrical reciprocity is useful for interpersonal engagement because we are not trying
to take over others’ perspectives or mold their experiences to fit our own conceptual frameworks.
Instead we are trying to recognize, appreciate, and respect difference and diversity, and in order to
do this we need to approach others with a sense of wonder.41 Young describes the sense of wonder
as the “openness to the newness and mystery of the other person.”42 Within the mental health
context, I think wonder can be a useful starting point for initiating relationships between patients
and caregivers. For example, suppose a caregiver is interacting with a person who has
schizophrenia and is experiencing delusional thoughts.43 Even though the patient’s utterances may
appear to be nonsensical, and may be a source of confusion for the caregiver’s interpretation, a
stance of wonder would involve engaging with that person and trying to do the best they can to
interact with them in a meaningful manner.
Although Young believes that we should cultivate a stance of wonder and create a
respectful distance between ourselves and others when engaging with them, La Caze notes that
wonder, on its own, is insufficient for achieving this goal. This is because wonder can be
interpreted as “a kind of distant awe” before the other that “turns their transcendence into a human
inscrutability” and wonder can become “a kind of prurient curiosity” which results in the adoption
of a “probing, investigative mode” towards others.44 As she notes, wonder can become
“dangerous” because it transforms the other person into something “exotic” and, by doing so, it
converts wonder’s openness into a “dominative desire to know and master the other person.”45
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This worry is particularly pressing in mental health care because there may be a tendency for
caregivers to become too involved in their patients lives and this can lead to patient resistance or
the fear that caregivers are overstepping their professional boundaries.
To overcome this problem, wonder must still focus on being open-minded and nonjudgmental but it must include an element of respect.46 Wonder needs to be united with respect
because wonder involves an openness to the unfamiliar but respect involves the acknowledgment
of similarity and/or common humanity with others and I believe this is one of the key features of
asymmetrical reciprocity.47 While respect and wonder provide the means of initiating contact with
others in a morally appropriate way, Young’s primary method for engaging with others is by asking
questions. Questions are generally a harmless way for someone to identify with another person, or
to express an interest in receiving their viewpoint on any subject matter. If I have an interest in
getting to know someone I am unfamiliar with, asking questions allows me to build a connection
with another person and interact with that person in interpersonal dialogue. Although asking
questions is a way of admitting that we do not already know the other person’s perspective, and
that we are curious to understand them better, La Caze maintains that we must still proceed with
caution and ensure that our questioning does not become “intrusive, invasive” or makes the other
person feel “uncomfortable.”48 I think this is where the sensitivity of an ethics of care can help. By
taking their patients’ perspectives into account by listening to the patient's personal narrative, and
by treating their patients with dignity, a caregiver’s influence can go a long way in helping improve
the lives of their patients. Respect limits our questioning of others and if caregivers wish to respect
their patients they should accept their differences by adopting a stance of moral humility and must
not attempt to “espouse their standpoint” and speak on their patients’ behalf.49 Acknowledging the
limits of understanding another person’s perspective, and realizing that we cannot project our own
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experiences onto others, is recognition of the other person’s self–respect and it provides a firm
foundation for interpersonal, empathetic engagement to occur.50

6. How Asymmetrical Reciprocity Cultivates Empathy and Relationships of Trust
The development of our empathetic capacities is something that allows us to connect with others
and learn about their personal narrative histories.51 Perhaps the best way for caregivers to establish,
and abide by, responsible empathetic knowing in the context of professional mental health care is
to build trust with their patients. Building trusting relationships between caregivers and care
recipients is very important because if a patient feels safe to discuss things with her caregivers,
that increased interaction can be valuable in the diagnostic process and, ultimately, be beneficial
for the patient’s health and well-being. Building trust with patients requires caregivers to practice
empathy by showing a willingness to listen to the patient’s voice. It requires caregivers to be openminded and to learn from their patients. And it requires caregivers to be accepting of the patients’
feelings and to not force their own opinion or view point on them.52 By cultivating empathy
caregivers can learn to value and respect their patients as persons rather than just viewing them as
‘patients’ with ‘illnesses.’
One way to develop trust and empathy is through open dialogue with others. Through
dialogue Young argues that we construct an account of the “web of social relations that surrounds
us and within which we act”53 and this image of connection reinforces the emphasis on relationality
evidenced in the ethics of care. As Code argues empathy is important because it “resists closure,
[it] invites conversation” and it “fosters and requires second-person relations.”54 Good
communication exhibited between both parties forms a part of the therapeutic treatment itself and
can result in improved patient outcomes and greater satisfaction with healthcare services.
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Conversations can be integral for defining problems and goals in a collaborative manner and
engaging with patients in dialogue results in patients feeling as if their voices mattered and it allows
patients to have some input on their care options.55 Conversely, poor communication and lack of
reciprocity can result in disengagement from mental health services. 56 Good caregivers listen to
their patients and will take the time and effort to reach out to them and provide opportunities for
participation and collaboration. But if caregivers are impatient, or dismiss their patients’ narrative
accounts, or do anything which shuts down intersubjective dialogue from happening, patients will
feel neglected and this is a serious problem. Given the systemic barriers and the negative impact
of social stigma on mental illness, it is very likely that persons living with mental health issues
have, at some point, been disrespected, disregarded and/or dehumanized. These attitudes towards
mental illness need to change, especially in professional health care settings, and stances of
asymmetrical reciprocity can begin to help overcome it.

7.1 How Asymmetrical Reciprocity Overcomes the Limits of Perspective-Taking
Reciprocity and mutual recognition are inherent in the concept of care. 57 But the ability to shift
perspectives and take the other person’s experiences into account in a caring, empathetic manner
does not necessarily lead to, or require, the mirroring approach that Benhabib’s symmetrical
reciprocity endorses. While practices of care must be reciprocal, asymmetrical reciprocity
overcomes some of the issues associated with empathy in a therapeutic context. An ethics of care
is more compatible with Young’s position of asymmetrical reciprocity because it is sensitive both
to the inequalities which exist between people and/or groups of people and it also recognizes the
“interconnectedness of moral agents.”58
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In response to the first objection concerning the limits of perspective-taking in empathy,
Code notes that even though good empathetic practices involves some kind of identification with
the other person empathy, at its best, “preserves yet seeks to know the ‘strangeness’” of the other
person; empathy “respects the boundaries between self and other” and it does not “seek to
assimilate or obliterate the ‘freedom’” of the other into itself.59 In empathetic exchanges, Bubandt
and Willerslev maintain that the recognition of difference between persons is something which is
“indispensable” and is “deliberately maintained” rather than something “completely dissolved”
and I believe asymmetrical reciprocity satisfies this requirement better than symmetrical
reciprocity.60 With respect to members of groups who have been historically marginalized and
discriminated against by dominant groups (e.g. the discrimination experienced by persons living
with mental health challenges), it is important for persons in positions of power and privilege to
not only respect the other person by not violating or undermining their autonomous choices
pertaining to their health care, but persons in power should not to assimilate, or co-opt, the
experiences of others. As Kain (1998) argues denying the existence of others, and denying the
uniqueness of their subjectivities,61 can be an effective way of “locking them into their
subordination.”62 Extending his argument, I think that by failing to acknowledge the differences
which exist between different groups in the name of symmetry and reversibility, Benhabib’s
approach has the potential of causing harm and/or epistemic violence to these groups.63 If we try
to minimize or refuse to see difference and treat people as equals, he argues that our tendency will
be to “deny their otherness, treat them as identical to us, assimilate them, see ourselves in them,
and negate their own different reality.”64 But if we recognize their otherness too much it will be
very difficult to see them as our equals since we will “tend to rank them - and probably as
inferior.”65 As a result we need a certain amount of otherness but we also need a certain amount
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of identity. This approach, I argue, is more consistent with Young’s theory than Benhabib’s
theory.66
Although the focus of the ethics of care is on the particular relationships it helps cultivate,
Gilligan (1993) maintains that a universal aspect of care lies in its “condemnation of exploitation
and hurt.”67 While Benhabib and Young both highlight the importance of dialogue in their
respective theories, as discussed earlier, the risk of perspective-taking found in Benhabib’s
symmetrical reciprocity is that it could potentially exploit the other person and contribute to further
marginalization. But practicing asymmetrical reciprocity can overcome this worry. Standing in
relations of asymmetry and irreversibility with others allows for more fruitful engagement to occur
because it requires caregivers to keep respectful distance from their patients and allow their
patients the opportunity to share their own experiences. As mentioned above, in order to
communicate effectively another aspect of developing reciprocal relationships between patients
and caregivers rests on the willingness to listen to the opinions and perspectives of others.68
Respectful listening involves “attentive and interested questioning”69 and instead of presuming
that we can take the other person’s perspective as our own for the purposes of entering into a
dialogue with them, it is more appropriate to approach these situations with a stance of “moral
humility.”70 Through open dialogue and respectful questioning, people can sometimes understand
each other across difference without reversing perspectives or identifying with each other. But
speakers cannot communicate with each other “unless there is a space differentiating them and
across which they communicate.”71 Since it does not attempt to eliminate differences entirely,
asymmetrical reciprocity provides this space more effectively.

7.2 How Asymmetrical Reciprocity Prevents “Compassion Fatigue”
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Whenever the notion of “care” is evoked in conversation, I think it is a common assumption for
some that the image of a “caring person” is one which is typically one-sided and, perhaps, selfsacrificial. But according to Pettersen (2011), understanding care based on an “individualistic
ontology” like this is problematic, especially in a mental health care setting, because it tends to
view the act of care as a “mono-directional activity” and something which is “transferred” from
the carer to the care recipient.72 Viewing care in this way is problematic because the caregiver’s
interests can be severely neglected since they are doing all the work and receiving little in return.
The advantage of an ethics of care, however, is that it views caring relationships as inherently
reciprocal and, by doing so, it exposes caring to be a relational process in which both sides
participate together.73
That said, in response to the second objection that empathy can result in empathic overarousal and ‘compassion fatigue,’ Code argues that responsible empathy is a “self-reflexive skill”
and when it is well-developed and practiced in an appropriate way, it “incorporates a capacity to
assess its own aptness: a capacity that enables its practitioners to judge the kind and degree of
empathy a situation, a person, or a group of people requires.”74 As she suggests, empathy at its
best calls for “a finely tuned sensitivity both in its cognitive moments (working out how much one
can/should know) and in its active ones.”75 In other words, if cultivated properly, responsible
caregivers would know the limits of their empathetic practices. To avoid the problem of
compassion fatigue mental health caregivers must, on the one hand, be willing to “intellectually
and emotionally identify, connect, and relate” with their patients but, at the same time, they must
also caution themselves against becoming excessively empathetic by maintaining awareness of
themselves as distinct from their patients.76 Asymmetrical reciprocity can aid in this process more
effectively, and can help prevent caregivers from overstepping their boundaries, because it insists
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on engaging with others in a respectful manner and remains adamant that we do not go too far into
the subjective experiences of the other. In this way, the identity of the caregiver is not lost and it
can help address the issue of becoming compassionately fatigued. Even though the feeling of
empathic over-arousal and compassion fatigue often comes as a result of a caregiver feeling
powerless to help others in need, one way to limit this problem is for caregivers to focus less on
how one is powerless and more time on the ways in which they can help make a positive impact
on the lives of their patients.77 This is where the collaboration and relationship-building found in
an ethics of care can play a significant role in fostering reciprocity between individuals. Building
positive relationships with patients and their families, treating patients with respect and
recognizing their fundamental dignity and humanity, avoiding paternalistic and dismissive
attitudes, and taking the necessary steps to support patient empowerment are all ways in which
professional caregivers can not only help their patients improve their health outcomes but also can
help prevent emotionally exhausting themselves in the process.

Conclusion
An ethics of mental health care should embody several key components. An ethics of mental health
care should foster communication between caregivers and patients, it should involve the
development of empathetic capacities and it should be grounded on respect for others in order to
create reciprocal relationships based on trust and care. The relationship between mental health care
professionals and patients living with mental health challenges is asymmetrical in its nature. Due
to many years of training and cultivating medical expertise pertaining to treating people with
mental health challenges, some may argue that mental health caregivers possess the skills, training,
and knowledge of mental illness that their patients may not necessarily have and, as a result, some
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may worry that this asymmetry is based on power positions and differences in epistemic privilege.
But it is important to note that epistemic privilege is a notion that applies to the patient as well,
and the doctor is as epistemically dependent upon the patient for successful treatment as is the
patient on the doctor. Given the long history of how stigma impacts our perceptions of persons
living with mental health challenges, it is important to note that doctors, nurses, and therapists can
learn a great deal from the actual lived experiences of their patients, information not neatly defined
in medical handbooks, training manuals, or the DSM. Patient narratives and testimonies offer
valuable sources of knowledge which can help those not living with mental health challenges to
gain a better understanding and appreciation of those unique experiences. This is another reason
why a collaborative, relational approach can be very promising for improving patient outcomes
and helping to preserve patient dignity.
In addition to treating whatever illness a patient has it should be the caregiver’s
responsibility to actively try and reach out to their patients in a caring, empathetic way. And instead
of using that position of privilege to create further distance between themselves and their patients,
they should take the initiative and try to bridge the gap between themselves and those they are
responsible for as caregivers. I acknowledge that the gap between the caregiver and the patient can
be extremely wide precisely because, unless you have first-hand experience of living with a
particular mental illness, it is impossible to fully understand with the situation of the other person.
However, a caregiver who treats their patients with respect, kindness, and demonstrates genuine
interest in listening to and understanding the life experiences of the patient, that commitment to
engagement will go a long way in bridging that gap with many patients. These core values and
aims are what constitute the kinds of relationships which are fostered via an ethic of care. Perhaps
trying to engage in a more thorough and “caring” approach is an ethical boundary that some
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therapists and caregivers may not wish to cross. But unless they are willing to engage with their
patients and take the time necessary for learning more about their subjective experiences, it will
be difficult to develop empathy in a meaningful and personal level.
However, if mental health care professionals adopt an ethics of care that is informed by a
practice of asymmetrical reciprocity, I think this is possible and improvements in the
patient/caregiver relationship will emerge. An ethics of care motivated by asymmetrical
reciprocity makes an effort to reach out to and understand the other in an inclusive manner, which
is why I believe this framework can be suitably implemented into mental health care. Despite some
issues associated with it empathy is still a valuable attitude to cultivate because it has numerous
benefits for patients who are recipients of medical care. Empathetic knowing requires a lot of work
develop correctly and it places a great deal of responsibility on caregivers who are using it. But in
order for caregivers to become better able to reach out and meet the needs of those who need it the
most, adopting a stance of asymmetrical reciprocity—and the willingness to get to know the other
person in a responsible manner via an ethics of care—is a good first step.
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